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Thema: Analyst - was ist das?

  1. #1

    Dabei seit

    Analyst - was ist das?

    sind das menschen die immer so reden als wenn sie recht haetten und dann doch total daneben liegen.!?
    wer kann noch einen gebrauchen : bin preiswert zu haben...
    sind das die , die von der zinssenkung total ueberrascht wurden und es nun besser wissen und sagen, es war ein fehler ?
    glaubt ihr eigentlich auch das sich die typen, EZB - Greenspan nicht hinter verschlossenen tueren in etwa absprechen ?
    das ami land will bestimmt noch weiter runter mit den zinsen und damit das gefaelle nicht zu gross wird , hallo europa komm mach mal ein wenig mit usw.

  2. #2

    Dabei seit
    81737 München
    Ach, gute Analysten sind schlecht für die Kleinanleger und gut für das eigene Unternehmen bzw. für den eigenen Geldbeutel. Wundert mich garnicht, daß letztes Jahr die Institutionellen Banken mehr Geld dennje gemacht haben und die ausgenutzten Kleinanleger auf 80% und mehr Verlust hocken.

  3. #3
    Herr Bert

    Caught in the Middle
    Financial analysts struggle to remain objective as
    their employers seek business from the companies
    they cover. In Asia, where self-governance is the
    guiding principle, the problem is particularly acute.
    Where does this leave investors?

    By Bruce Gilley/HONG KONG
    Issue cover-dated May 17, 2001

    BENJAMIN WEDMORE and Ravi Sarathy had a
    lot in common. Both were equity analysts for major
    investment houses. Both covered technology. But their
    official views on Japan's would-be Internet zaibatsu
    Softbank were vastly different.

    In February 2000, when Softbank was trading at
    around ¥45,000 ($365) a share (adjusted for a share
    split since then), Sarathy predicted the shares would
    reach ¥133,000 by the year's end. Wedmore stuck by
    his low-ball target of ¥6,700. The two analysts differed
    by an eye-popping factor of 20.

    Today, Softbank is worth just ¥4,500. Tech stocks
    have fallen everywhere. But it's clear which analyst had
    a better grip on the company.

    Sarathy, who now runs his own computer company in
    Hong Kong, won't talk about his famous call. Nor will
    the U.S. investment bank he worked for, Lehman

    But one fact stands out from the time when Sarathy
    issued his optimistic forecasts: Lehman Brothers was an
    adviser to the firm, an underwriter of shares in Softbank
    partners such as Chinadotcom, an adviser and future
    investor in Nasdaq Japan (a joint venture between
    Softbank and Nasdaq), and a joint investor with
    Softbank in a bank and an on-line securities house.
    Wedmore, by contrast, worked for a company, HSBC
    Securities, which had no such business relationship with

    "I was beholden to no one," says Wedmore. "Our
    investment banking department here is small. I did not
    have anyone looking over my shoulder telling me to
    value the stock higher."

    After a financial crisis and an Internet bubble, Asia has
    finally woken up to the perils of equity research by
    investment banks. Sometimes the problem is bad luck
    or bad analysis. But usually it is the well-known conflict
    of interest of "sell-side" equity analysts, whose
    employers are trying to underwrite share issues or get
    other business with the companies they cover.

    That is a long-standing global problem. But in Asia it
    has taken on new dimensions that the region's
    investors--large and small--are only now coming to
    terms with.

    "Investors don't want any more B.S. from investment
    banks," says Stephen Brown, research head of regional
    brokerage firm Kim Eng Securities. "Their research is
    now seen as not particularly valuable."

    While the research of large Western investment banks
    began to lose its gloss in the early 1990s in the West,
    their authority in Asia in the boom days was
    unquestioned. In addition, many companies in the
    region couldn't countenance even gentle criticism from
    investment banks that wanted their business. A
    breathless, even intoxicated, tone often crept into
    company reports.

    Less stringent enforcement of rules in Asian markets on
    the separation of research and investment-banking
    operations also probably played a factor, though
    investment banks insist their walls remain firm.

    Either way, change is afoot. Market regulators across
    the region are considering ways to bolster laws and law
    enforcement to make research more fair. That is part of
    a broader trend to clean up markets and improve
    corporate governance in the region.

    Meanwhile, institutional investors are beefing up their
    own research arms, while specialized and small
    brokerage firms are coming to the region touting their
    lack of reliance on underwriting fees.

    "We never take the bait on what an investment bank
    tells us," says Roger Ellis, chief investment officer at JF
    Asset Management in Hong Kong. "It's always going to
    be difficult for an investment bank to be objective in its
    analysis, so it serves us well to do our own research."

    In the U.S., the first detailed report on the bias of
    sell-side research in the 1980s found that these analysts
    systematically overrated companies they were
    underwriting. A joint report by the Harvard and
    Wharton business schools found that sell-side analysts
    had forecast 23% annual earnings growth on average
    when the actual turned out to be around 10%.

    That bias worsened in the 1990s when the end of fixed
    broking commissions in the U.S. forced analysts to earn
    their keep by becoming rainmakers for the
    investment-banking business. According to research
    group First Call Corp., the ratio of buy to sell
    recommendations in the U.S. went from 6-1 in the early
    1990s to 100-1 last year.

    "If the brokerage firm wants to develop a business
    relationship with an issuer company and it offers
    research coverage of the issuer, by necessity, the
    brokerage firm compromises its objectivity," acting
    U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman
    Laura Unger said in a speech in April. "The tension
    arises because the firm's research analyst typically
    becomes part of the investment-banking team formed
    to promote the offering for the issuer."

    Asia's tech boom is awash with stories of stock analysts
    who puffed shares at the same time that their
    investment-banking arms were underwriting new

    Take the listing and subsequent share issues of Oracle
    Japan on Tokyo's over-the-counter market by Nikko
    Salomon Smith Barney. Oracle Japan went public in
    February 1999 at ¥4,700 a share (adjusted for a stock
    split since then).

    In subsequent research reports, Nikko Salomon Smith
    Barney touted the stock as a harbinger of a
    business-to-business e-commerce boom in Japan. The
    stock price shot up to ¥51,000 mark a year later--a
    wacky price-to-earnings multiple of 450. Nikko
    Salomon Smith Barney then issued another research
    report in early March 2000 that asserted the stock was
    "not overvalued" given "bright prospects in e-commerce
    B2B business." That pushed the price up further.

    With the stock peaking, Oracle and its partner Nippon
    Steel sold 14.5 million shares in the company at
    ¥55,000 each in mid-April, with Nikko Salomon Smith
    Barney handling the issue. Based on the size of the sale,
    and assuming the standard 5% fee, the investment bank
    earned about $325 million for that one transaction.

    "The work Nikko Salomon Smith Barney did for that
    deal was phenomenal," says one industry insider. "They
    took the stock up with their research, decided when the
    price was right to sell, and then took the fees."

    Nikko Salomon Smith Barney spokesman Dan Cox
    says the research may have been flawed but denies it
    was linked to the underwriting activity. "Was it a great
    call? Maybe not. But it's an individual issue, not an
    institutional one," he says.

    Oracle Japan shares plunged to ¥17,000 by early May,
    even though sales and profits have been in line with
    those predicted by Nikko Salomon Smith Barney. The
    message from the market: a price-to-earnings multiple
    of 450 was indeed badly overvalued, three times
    overvalued to be exact.

    While most investment banks assert the separation of
    research and banking, others are more open about the

    Credit Suisse First Boston took oil giant China National
    Offshore Oil Corp.'s 71%-owned subsidiary CNOOC
    Ltd. public in February in a $1.4 billion issue. In a
    recent report on the transaction sent to clients, CSFB
    openly touts the role of its research in boosting
    CNOOC's share price: "In part due to CSFB's strong
    aftermarket support, comprising both active trading and
    extensive research coverage, the stock appreciated
    16.5% on its first day of trade," it says. "Upon
    publication of the CSFB research report [three weeks
    after the listing], CNOOC's shares rose 11% over two

    "There is a continuous tension between the
    independence of the analyst and wanting to gain market
    share in new issue underwriting," says Nicholas
    Andrews, head of Asia equity research outside Japan
    for CSFB. "It's implicit that research by the sell-side is
    part of the sales effort."

    Implicit, yes. But it's the lack of explicitness that hurts.
    Another good example is Pacific Century CyberWorks,
    which along with Softbank was one of the greatest
    busts of the Internet in Asia.

    Investment bank BNP Paribas Peregrine underwrote
    shares in PCCW and subsidiaries like data-centre
    operator iLink, helped Chairman Richard Li sell some
    of his holdings in the company and arranged loans for
    the company.

    At the same time, its analysts constantly maintained the
    most rosy share price predictions about the company
    among analysts in Asia watching the firm. BNP's head
    of Hong Kong research, Adrian Ngan, was regularly
    quoted in the local media advising investors to stick
    with PCCW even as its shares crashed from HK$24
    ($3.08) to HK$3. The media is partly to blame for
    failing to note BNP's interest in promoting PCCW's
    share price. But the absence of rules that would have
    forced BNP to make its interest more explicit made the
    slip-up easier. Ngan declined to return several phone

    In other cases, investment banks have used odd
    terminology in their reports, apparently to avoid
    offending clients. For example: Morgan Stanley, which
    handled the $5 billion China Unicom listing in June
    2000, "revised" its target price for the company from
    HK$25 to HK$19 in January after the price had
    plunged to HK$8, half the issue price. Despite the
    change, the bank maintained its "strong buy"
    recommendation on the stock.

    Mark Shuper, co-head of Morgan Stanley's Asia
    telecoms research, points out that the bank has started
    telling clients that rival China Mobile, whose main
    investment bank is Goldman Sachs, is a better buy than
    China Mobile. Still, he admits the coverage of China
    Unicom wasn't ideal. "With hindsight," he says, "I
    should have downgraded it" when the stock began
    heading south.

    China's entry into the World Trade Organization could
    make such problems worse. China already dominates
    Asia's new-shares market, accounting for nearly half of
    the $47 billion raised in Asia outside Japan last year.
    The opening of the mainland's banking sector to foreign
    participation could put further pressure on investment
    banks to tone down any criticism of company or
    macroeconomic performance there given the new
    opportunities available.

    To be sure, many respected analysts remain in the field.
    Property analyst Franklin Lam of UBS Warburg is the
    perennial prophet of doom on the Hong Kong property
    market, where a few threatening words from a property
    tycoon can send shivers of fear through an investment
    banker's pinstripes. Client Sun Hung Kai Properties
    recently postponed a new share issue that UBS was
    expected to help underwrite after Lam turned negative
    on the market, not exactly something to please his
    underwriting colleagues.

    Yet analysts like Lam are well known exactly because
    they are exceptions, outspoken gadflys in an industry
    that encourages muffled consensus.

    As Brown of Kim Eng Securities puts it: "The top line
    and the bottom line of an investment bank is to get
    investment-bank business. You can't have a research
    department that is not helping to fit the pipes."

    What are the solutions? Until recently, self-governance
    has been the guiding principle for regulating sell-side
    research. Investment banks in most markets only have
    to disclose if they have been involved recently in a new
    share issue for the company they are covering. That
    may now change. In the U.S., SEC regulators have
    threatened to tighten rules on research disclosure if the
    banks don't shape up. New rules might include a ban
    on the insidious practice of giving issuers the ability to
    influence research before it goes out, something analysts
    say is increasingly common in Asia. Another change
    might force banks to disclose more prominently, and in
    greater detail, their existing or future business
    relationships with companies they write reports about.
    The SEC also might ban analysts from taking part in
    road shows.

    "Disclosure is most important to retail investors who
    might not know there are relationships," says Ellis of JF
    Asset Management. "We have always had a healthy
    dose of scepticism."

    Similar moves have been mooted by Hong Kong's
    Securities and Futures Commission, though no changes
    are likely soon. The SFC is also considering a "fair
    disclosure" law similar to that in the U.S., which would
    prevent analysts from having better access to
    information on companies than the man on the street.
    Such inside information is a powerful incentive for
    analysts to issue glowing reports since their
    investment-banking divisions can often trade on the

    Still, with regulators slow to act, investors are likely to
    take their own measures to protect themselves from the
    dangers of sell-side research. Large institutional
    investors in Asia like GE Capital, Fidelity and Scottish
    Widows have beefed up their own research capabilities
    in recent years. In addition, the research newsletters,
    sectoral specialists, and small research-driven
    brokerages firms that are common on Wall Street are
    starting to appear in Asia.

    Investment-risk specialist Standard & Poor's, for
    example, launched an Asian equity-research service in
    April. Meanwhile, banks and insurance specialist
    Fox-Pitt Kelton opened its first Asia office in Hong
    Kong last year. Its corporate finance side is small in the
    U.S. and Europe and barely existent in Asia. That has
    allowed it to take contrarian stands, such as its hold
    recommendation on Hong Kong's popular Hang Seng

    "Our analysts are not under the same pressures as
    others," says John Yakas, head of the Asia office.

    All that could force the investment banks to clean up
    their acts. Lehman Brothers has recently been talking
    tough on Wall Street about its renewed commitment to
    objective research. Andrews of CSFB says the banks
    also need to be more careful in selecting which
    companies to underwrite. "The key is to sponsor good
    companies and to price them sensibly," he says.

    The bear market worldwide also may help analysts to
    focus on objectivity, notes one analyst . Fewer new
    issues and more-cautious institutional investors will give
    a greater spur to making honest predictions.

    Keeping that bear-market sobriety may be crucial if
    they are to earn back the trust of investors. "The system
    is here to stay," says Andrews. "But those using
    research to jam investors with bad deals will eventually
    suffer." Far Eastern Economic Review

  4. #4
    und trotzdem wird bald wieder die Masse der Kleinanleger auf die Spinner hören, weil sie sich mit Kursgewinnen rühmen werden und somit irrtümlich beliebt machen.

  5. #5
    Verhaltenskodex für

    Offenlegung von Interessenkonflikten

    Cls. New York, 21. Mai

    Der seit längerer Zeit von verschiedener Seite
    geäusserten Besorgnis, dass die Wall-Street-Analytiker
    bzw. die Research-Abteilungen der Wertschriftenhäuser
    ihre Aufgabe oft nicht unabhängig wahrnehmen könnten
    und folglich keine objektiven Anlage-Empfehlungen
    abgäben, soll jetzt mit der Erarbeitung eines
    Verhaltenskodexes für Analytiker begegnet werden.
    Damit folgt die Wall Street dem Beispiel Kanadas, wo
    unlängst solche Richtlinien vorgeschlagen wurden. Es
    geht zum einen darum, Interessenkonflikte, die
    zweifellos in vielen Fällen bestehen, offenzulegen sowie
    gewisse ethische Standards zu formulieren. Eine
    konzertierte Aktion der Investmentbanken soll dem
    Vernehmen nach bereits weit fortgeschritten sein. Die
    Kritik von Anlegern und Aufsichtsbehörden sowie von
    Seiten der Medien hat den Druck für diese Art von
    Selbstregulierung bzw. -disziplinierung verstärkt. Im
    Urteil der Securities Industry Association (SIA) ist
    entschlossenes Handeln angesagt, um zu verhindern,
    dass wegen der zweifellos vorhandenen schwarzen
    Schafe die ganze Branche angeprangert wird. - Im
    amerikanischen Kongress sind Anhörungen über
    potenzielle Interessenkonflikte an der Wall Street und
    daraus zu ziehende Konsequenzen anberaumt. Nach
    Richard Baker, dem Vorsitzenden des Unterausschusses
    für Kapitalmärkte, haben Anleger ein Recht, über solche
    Interessenkonflikte Aufschluss zu erhalten. Wenn ein
    Wertpapier- Analytiker der Firma X die Aktie Y zum Kauf
    empfiehlt, dann ist es von Belang, ob und wie der
    Analytiker oder die Firma X selbst an Y engagiert bzw.
    mit Y involviert sind. Besonders kritisiert wurden in
    letzter Zeit Fälle, wo die Kompensation von Analytikern
    an spezielle Transaktionen geknüpft waren: Der
    Analytiker macht Empfehlungen bei IPOs oder Fusionen,
    sein Arbeitgeber ist Berater für die gleichen
    Transaktionen, verdient Geld und belohnt den Analytiker
    mit einem Bonus. Um den Druck auf die Analytiker,
    «subjektiven Research» zu produzieren, zu mindern,
    wurde in Kanada u. a. vorgeschlagen, dass der Chef
    einer Research-Abteilung direkt dem Chief Executive
    Officer und nicht den Vorstehern der diversen
    Bankabteilungen unterstellt sein sollte. NZZ

  6. #6
    und wer kontrolliert sowas in Deutschland hierzulande besteht noch sehr großer Handlungsbedarf in Sachen Kleinanleger-Schutz.

  7. #7

    Dabei seit
    Als erste Reaktion auf die Klagen der Anlegergemeinde verbietet Merrill Lynch den eigenen Analysten nun, die Aktien, die sie empfehlen, selbst zu halten. Damit sollen Interessenkonflikte und die daraus folgenden rufschädigenden Klagen vermieden werden.

    Die Auflage, die sofort in Kraft tritt, soll "das Vertrauen der Anleger in die Seriosität der Analysten" stärken.

    Aktien, die Analysten selbst auf der Empfehlungsliste haben, müssen innerhalb eines bestimmten Zeitraumes verkauft werden. Analysten können die Posititionen entweder verkaufen oder diese in Konten umbuchen, über die sie keine Kontrolle mehr haben. Darüber hinaus haben die Analysten die Möglichkeit, die Aktien zu halten, können diese aber nur verkaufen, wenn die Empfehlung auf "Neutral" oder schlechter lautet.

    Anleger sagen den Analysten schon länger nach, Buy-Ratings aus eigenem Interesse beizubehalten, obwohl die Fundamentaldaten der Unternehmen sich entscheidend geändert haben.

    Investmentbanken teilen den Kunden in letzter Zeit verstärkt mit, ob die Analysten auch eigene Aktien von Unternehmen halten. So gab die US Investmentbank Prudential Securities bekannt, daß man ab jetzt Positionen von Analysten in den Research-Reports nennen werde. Der Analyst Mark Rowen hält Aktien von eBay, hat aber keine Positionen in den Aktien von Amazon.com, Priceline.com und anderen Unternehmen, die er auf seiner Research-Liste stehen hat.

  8. #8
    ANALysten sind Menschen die euch empfehlen eine Aktie zu verkaufen damit Sie und ihre Banken usw sie billig kriegen. Nachdem diese dann verdoppelt bis verzehnfacht sind (im Kurs), preisen Euch dieselben ANALysten diese als Superaktie an, die meisten kaufen dann, und wundern sich warum alles fällt wenn die GROSSEN aussteigen.
    Immer versuchen auf der richtigen Welle zu schwimmen, das Geld ist nicht weg es ist nachher nur bei den Anderen
    Gruß Euer Großmütterchen

  9. #9
    analysten sorgen für Übertreibung und Verwirrung an den Börsen!

  10. #10
    Kurse machen Analysen, nicht umgekehrt!

    Beispiel BROADVISION:
    Vor 2 Monaten von allen verpöhnt, heute das vierfache wert und eine Musteraktie (echt peinlich).

    Drum laßt uns alle mal zusammen halten und Analysten suchen die ehrlich sind! Fallen euch welche ein? Ich könnte hier 100 Gegenbeispiele nennen doch kein Beispiel!

    EMI mit 98% Wahrscheinlichkeit trifft das Gegenteil dessen ein was die sagen!
    Gefolgt von Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserschwein !


  11. #11
    Was ist vergleichbar mit einem Analysten ?

    Jemand der das komplette Kamasutra auswendig weiß, aber keine einzige Frau kennt.

  12. #12

    Dabei seit
    Deutschland, 81673 München
    es wäre doch ganz einfach---

    --einfach das shortselling verbieten--

    --das kommt nämlich noch dazu!--nicht das sie ihre aktien "oben" verkaufen, sondern zusätzlich auch noch short gehen--


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